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I. Between Power and Faith#

The first time I read "Party Members, Party Power, and Party Struggles: The Organizational Form of the Kuomintang in China from 1924 to 1949," I was both shocked by its substantial historical materials and inspired by its structured analysis. This book is not a simple narrative of party history but attempts to understand how a political party played an extremely complex role in the shaping of modern China. The author, Mr. Wang Qisheng, points out that he approaches the subject from a social history perspective, trying to combine political history with social history, examining the Kuomintang within the broader context of social historical changes. The book cites over three hundred sources, including dozens of lesser-known party newspapers, journals, and provincial party magazines. This solid collection of historical materials and interdisciplinary perspective provides important clues for understanding the institutional logic and power dynamics of the Kuomintang.

I chose to write this note partly out of a profound interest in the relationship between party power and state power, and partly to seek insights for modern governance. As a member of the Chinese Communist Party, I often reflect on the governance logic of modern enterprises and governments from the perspective of organizational operation and power control. How historical party organizations shaped power structures and faced internal factional struggles offers experiences and lessons that are not only political science issues but also have practical reference value for contemporary organizational security and governance.

II. A Political Science Profile#

Wang Qisheng is a professor in the Department of History at Peking University, engaged in research on modern Chinese history for many years. This book is the result of ten years of research, continuing his focus on the history of the Kuomintang while incorporating methods from political sociology and organizational theory. He emphasizes viewing the Kuomintang as a modern political party organization, analyzing its failures not only in terms of ideology and leader personality but also focusing on institutional structures and their interaction with the social environment. The three themes in the book's title—"Party Members, Party Power, and Party Struggles"—indicate that it is concerned with institutional design, internal power relations, and the institutionalization of intra-party struggles.

The text is structured into several parts: the first half explores the reorganization of the Kuomintang, its party governance concepts, and the composition of its members; the middle section analyzes the operation of party power within the government, military, and society; the latter half discusses how party struggles manifest in institutionalized conflicts and how factional politics influence the fate of the party. Methodologically, the author not only compares the influences of the Soviet Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party on the Kuomintang but also extensively uses party materials, newspapers, and archives from both the central and local levels of the Kuomintang. This reconstruction of materials gives the book's argument both a macro institutional perspective and rich micro case details.

III. Organization is Power#

Leninist Organizational Structure and the Reorganization of the Kuomintang#

The first national congress of the Kuomintang was held in Guangzhou in 1924, assisted by Soviet advisors such as Borodin, reorganizing the party organization based on the model of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Soviet advisors helped the Kuomintang establish a Leninist party structure, giving the party organization characteristics of high centralization and discipline. To gain popular support, the Kuomintang collaborated with the Chinese Communist Party, forming the first United Front; many Communist Party members joined the Kuomintang as individuals to jointly advance the revolution.

Guided by these Leninist organizational principles, the Kuomintang established a Central Committee, political meetings, and other institutions, emphasizing democratic centralism and requiring party members to obey organizational decisions. The author points out that the Kuomintang attempted to shape a party machine capable of mobilizing the masses and controlling the military and government through organizational reformation. However, due to the Kuomintang's weak original organizational foundation, complex member composition, and the constraints of local factional powers, the Leninist structure did not fully materialize. In the triangle relationship between the party, government, and military, the party's power remained the weakest. This structural weakness laid hidden dangers for the later imbalance between party power and state power.

The Relationship Between Party Power, State Power, and Military Power#

Wang Qisheng repeatedly emphasizes the distinction and interaction between the "party power" held by the Kuomintang and "state power" and "military power." The party's central organization theoretically possesses leadership over the government and military, but in reality, warlord forces and local governments often supersede the party. Due to the lack of a strong organizational supervision mechanism, party members' recognition of party power remains largely symbolic. This separation of powers leads to party power being unable to effectively constrain military actions or fully control local administration. This contrasts sharply with the Soviet Communist Party's model of controlling the military and government through internal party organization.

The Concept of "Weak Dictatorial Party"#

The author introduces the concept of a "weak dictatorial party," arguing that although the Kuomintang attempted to establish a one-party dictatorship, due to its loose organization, numerous factions, and insufficient institutional enforcement, it was unable to achieve either democratic politics or true dictatorship. This dilemma of "having the desire for dictatorship but lacking the power to enforce it" led to signs of decline for the Kuomintang from the very beginning of its governance. A report from a reading group at Shanghai University summarizes this concept, pointing out that the author focuses on the three major themes of party members, party power, and party struggles, attempting to respond to the essence of the Kuomintang as a weak dictatorial party. In my view, this analysis provides a theoretical paradigm for understanding the relationship between power and organizational capability: the intention of power must be matched with organizational capability; both are indispensable.

IV. The Institutionalization of Party Struggles#

The Formation of Factional Politics#

Factional struggles within the Kuomintang have a long history. After Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925, the "Reorganization Faction" led by Wang Jingwei and the "Xishan Faction" represented by Hu Hanmin competed for party power, while Chiang Kai-shek, who actually controlled the military, held the ultimate initiative through military power. Different factions within the party not only had disagreements on routes and policies but were also incompatible in terms of sources of power and social bases. As the Northern Expedition progressed, the Kuomintang's military and political cadres spread across the country, establishing local bases of power and forming a complex network of factions.

The Institutionalization of Struggles and Governance#

Faced with a multitude of factions, the Kuomintang attempted to institutionalize internal struggles through amendments to the party constitution and convening party congresses. Chiang Kai-shek proposed the idea of "governing the country through the party and leading the party with the military," hoping to resolve factional conflicts through organizational principles. After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, the Kuomintang initiated "party reform" on the island, attempting to eliminate corruption and factions and establish a more centralized and unified organization. Wikipedia records that from 1950 to 1952, Chiang Kai-shek launched a party reform movement, establishing the Central Reform Committee, dedicated to eliminating defeatism, factionalism, and bureaucratism within the party, emphasizing institutionalization and organizational cohesion. This movement aimed to enhance the party's combat effectiveness through centralizing power and adjusting the social base, ultimately amending the party constitution to redefine the Kuomintang as a revolutionary democratic party. However, this reform only temporarily alleviated the symptoms of internal division, and factional politics did not truly disappear.

Party Struggles and the Fate of State Power#

During the mainland period, the internal war pressures and increasingly complex social contradictions faced by the Kuomintang intensified party struggles. The split between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, as well as conflicts with the Guangxi warlords and other local forces, severely weakened the cohesion of party power. Factional struggles drained party resources, affected government efficiency, and weakened the military's combat effectiveness. In this context, party struggles were not only a form of power competition but also became a systemic ailment. The author believes that this incurable institutional party struggle was one of the key reasons for the Kuomintang's ultimate failure.

V. The Tension Between Individuals and Organizations#

The Composition of Party Members and Social Base#

The social composition of Kuomintang members is diverse: it includes early revolutionary intellectuals, a large number of military and political cadres absorbed during the Northern Expedition, local gentry, and businessmen, as well as Communists and non-partisan youth who joined during the reorganization. This mixed structure brought a broad social base but also led to differentiated organizational identity. The nearly 40 party publications and provincial party materials cited in the book show that the central party's assessment standards for members were not strict, and local party branches often viewed the recruitment of members as a means to gain political resources. Therefore, the symbolic significance of party membership far outweighed its substantive constraints.

Organizational Discipline and Individual Fate#

The author points out that Leninist parties emphasize unconditional obedience and discipline. However, the Kuomintang lacked effective mechanisms for enforcing organizational discipline. Members were often guided by personal relationships and local interests, with strong personal dependencies. For ordinary party members, joining the Kuomintang was both a way to seek political protection and a means to gain economic benefits or social status. During the Anti-Japanese War and the civil war, a large number of party members defected, and the party organization could not effectively mobilize grassroots forces, reflecting the weak connection between the party and the masses.

From the perspective of individual fate, Kuomintang members often found themselves in conflict between organizational rationality and personal rationality. Loyalty was demanded to be placed above all else, but the organization's support for members was limited. Within the military system, the party army failed to transform into the national army, with officers often loyal to Chiang Kai-shek personally rather than to the party organization. This loyalty structure made members easy victims of power struggles and made it difficult for the party organization to cultivate a stable cadre team.

The Ideals and Realities of Party Members#

The Kuomintang has always promoted the Three Principles of the People, depicting the future of the nation in terms of nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. However, for many party members, the gap between these ideals and reality is significant. The book reveals through numerous cases that many members' understanding of the Three Principles of the People remains at the level of slogans, with factional interests and personal futures truly determining their political behavior. In this context, idealized political beliefs become propaganda tools, while organizational operations turn into exchanges of interests. This contradiction not only weakens party power but also causes members to lose direction amidst the storms of institutional change.

VI. Theoretical Context and Academic Echoes#

Dialogue with Classical Political Sociology#

From an academic perspective, "Party Members, Party Power, and Party Struggles" places the Kuomintang within the framework of modern party theory, providing a new path for understanding China's party system. Weber emphasized the rationality and legitimacy of bureaucracy, but although the Kuomintang introduced bureaucratic structures, it did not form a stable bureaucratic system; Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" points out that organizations inevitably move toward oligarchic rule, yet the Kuomintang simultaneously experienced a situation of multiple factions coexisting. The concept of "weak dictatorial party" indicates that the desire for oligarchization within the organization was not supported by institutional capability, ultimately leading to fragmented power.

Moreover, the author's research interacts with studies by scholars such as Zhou Xueguang and Lin Chuili on the relationship between party and government. They generally believe that there exists a phenomenon of "organizational embedding" in the Chinese party-government relationship, where party organizations are embedded within the government and society, exercising power through organizational mobilization. This book further points out that when organizational mobilization is insufficient, party power cannot be exerted, and state power may escape the constraints of party power. This analysis reminds us that when exploring organizational governance, we must not only consider power intentions but also examine organizational capabilities and social bases.

Academic Contributions and Limitations#

The main contribution of this book lies in systematically sorting through archival materials to reveal the institutional logic of the Kuomintang's party power operations and proposing the theoretical concept of "weak dictatorial party." The author enriches the research perspective on the history of Chinese political parties through interdisciplinary methods and expands the theoretical space of comparative party studies. The in-depth analysis of party member composition, party power operations, and the institutionalization of party struggles provides important references for understanding the Kuomintang's failure and contemporary party governance.

However, due to space limitations, the author does not discuss the interaction between social economic structures and power operations in depth. For example, how social forces such as the capitalist class, working class, and peasantry influenced party power operations is mentioned in the book but not elaborated upon. Additionally, the author focuses on the Kuomintang and discusses the dynamic interactions between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang less, failing to fully demonstrate the impact of the competition between the two parties on the evolution of party power. These aspects leave room for further research.

VII. From Historical Party Struggles to Contemporary Governance#

Institutional Inertia and Modern Politics#

Although the party power structure of the Kuomintang failed, its attempts to establish party governance have profoundly influenced subsequent political systems. Whether it is the one-party system that persisted in Taiwan after 1949 or the party-state system established in the People's Republic of China, both have absorbed Leninist organizational principles to varying degrees and undergone localized transformations. Wikipedia notes that when the Kuomintang controlled Taiwan, it implemented a one-party dictatorship, gradually relaxing and introducing competitive elections only in the late 1970s. This shows the inertia of the party power system; once combined with state machinery, it is difficult to collapse on its own.

From Party Struggles to Organizational Games#

In modern organizations, power struggles are not unique to political parties. Enterprises, government agencies, and even non-profit organizations experience internal games. The institutionalization of party struggles reminds us that constructing effective checks and balances within organizations to prevent excessive concentration or dispersion of power is a core governance issue. Contemporary enterprises rely on institutional design, cultural construction, and technological means to establish auditing and compliance mechanisms to avoid internal interest groups hijacking the organization. The Kuomintang's historical experience of being unable to prevent factional infighting provides a cautionary tale for contemporary organizational management: only through dual constraints of institutions and culture can internal power avoid devolving into destructive competition.

Digital Governance and Party Power Logic#

Governance in the era of information and intelligence requires organizational rationality. The organizational mobilization and discipline emphasized by party power can be transformed into data-driven decision-making and risk control in the digital age. Modern political parties and governments grasp public opinion through data analysis and optimize resource allocation through algorithms. The Kuomintang's neglect of grassroots information collection and feedback led to a disconnection between party power and society; similarly, today's organizations lacking transparent data mechanisms will also lose credibility amid information distortion and decision-making errors.

One additional point: BlueDog expresses unease and panic over the digital silence here!

VIII. Some Reflections#

Out of a special sensitivity and curiosity about the mechanisms of power operation, I note that the historical Kuomintang pursued centralization organizationally, but due to a lack of effective technical and institutional support, it ultimately led to power loss and organizational collapse. Modern security governance also faces the contradiction between central control and marginal flexibility. Excessive centralization can lead to single points of failure, while excessive decentralization may result in skyrocketing coordination costs. How to achieve reasonable decentralization and centralization within a security framework is a common challenge for technical managers and political governors.

Another insight lies in the paradox of "weak dictatorship": the mismatch between power intentions and organizational capabilities brings significant governance risks. The Kuomintang had a strong desire for dictatorship but lacked the organizational capacity to support that desire; ultimately, the central government and military were not constrained by party power, and the party became a subordinate. This reminds me of corporate security strategies: if security strategies are formulated too stringently without organizational culture and technical capabilities to support them, employees will choose to evade or bypass the system, rendering the strategy ineffective. Only by integrating institutional design with organizational capability can effective control be achieved.

Finally, the lessons of institutionalizing party struggles remind us that conflicts are inevitable in any organization, but they can be resolved through institutional and cultural management. Transparent and fair competition mechanisms and effective supervision systems can transform conflicts into innovative driving forces. The Kuomintang's failure to establish such a system led to destructive internal struggles. As modern managers, we should embed feedback and correction mechanisms within organizational structures, reducing the risk of power abuse through a multi-layered governance system.

IX. The Shadow of Organization and the Light of Individuals#

"Party Members, Party Power, and Party Struggles," with its rich historical materials and rigorous analysis, reveals the logic of the generation, operation, and disintegration of party power within the Kuomintang from reorganization to demise. Through a systematic study of party member composition, party power systems, and party struggle mechanisms, the author proposes the thought-provoking concept of "weak dictatorial party," reminding us of the importance of matching power intentions with organizational capabilities. This book is not only a significant work in the history of Chinese political parties but also an important reference for modern organizational theory and political sociology.

History is a mirror that reflects the shadows of organizations and illuminates the brilliance of individuals. In the vast machinery of power and institutions, human rationality and faith are often suppressed, but it is precisely the reflection and actions of individuals that can drive institutional progress. Looking back at the rise and fall of the Kuomintang, we see both the limitations of power structures and the possibilities of ideological liberation. For us today, whether in the political realm or the technology industry, this work reminds us that the strength of an organization comes from the unity of institutions and capabilities, and the legitimacy of power derives from respect and trust in individuals.

Appendix X - Timeline and Relationship Table of Factional Evolution within the Kuomintang (1924-2025)#